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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a uniﬁed approach to study participation and voting
in multiple elections. The theoretical framework combines an “uncertain-voter”
model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior. We apply our frame-
work to study turnout and voting in U.S. national (presidential and congres-
sional) elections, and structurally estimate the model using individual-level data
for the 2000 elections. The estimated model replicates the patterns of absten-
tion, selective abstention, split-ticket voting, and straight-ticket voting observed
in the data. We also quantify the relationships between observed individual
characteristics and unobserved citizens’ ideological preferences, information, and
civic duty. Finally, we assess the eﬀects of policies that may increase citizens’
information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior.
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Who votes and for whom people vote determine the outcome of elections. Hence, citizens’
participation and voting decisions in elections are fundamental inputs in the political process
that shapes the policies adopted by democratic societies. It is therefore not surprising that
political scientists and political economists have long been concerned with understanding
observed patterns of electoral turnout and voting.
In the United States, there is considerable variation in voter turnout both within and
across types of elections (e.g., Blais (2000)). Also, participation and abstention rates are
in general not uniform in the population of eligible voters, but are correlated with several
demographic characteristics such as age, education, gender, and race (e.g., Matsusaka and
Palda (1999)). When multiple elections are held simultaneously, many diﬀerent patterns of
abstention and voting behavior are observed in individual-level data. In particular, often
people vote in some elections but abstain in others (selective abstention), or vote for candi-
dates of diﬀerent parties in diﬀerent elections (split-ticket voting). In national elections, for
example, it is typically the case that more people vote for President than for Congress, and a
sizeable fraction of voters vote for the Republican presidential candidate and the Democratic
congressional candidate or the other way around (e.g., Burden and Kimball (2002)).1
These observations have motivated a voluminous body of theoretical and empirical re-
search in political economy aimed at interpreting the evidence.2 For the most part, however,
the literature has addressed the issues of voter turnout and voting behavior separately. In
this paper, we propose a uniﬁed approach to study participation and voting in multiple
elections. The theoretical framework we propose combines an “uncertain-voter” model of
turnout (which shares some insights with the models of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996,
1999) and Matsusaka (1995)), with a spatial (Downsian) model of voting behavior. We then
apply our framework to study turnout and voting in U.S. national (presidential and congres-
sional) elections, and we structurally estimate our model using individual-level data for the
2000 elections.
1Many of these phenomena are also common in several other countries (e.g., Blais (2000)).
2We discuss the related literature in Section 2.
1We consider a spatial environment with a continuum of citizens facing multiple simulta-
neous two-candidate elections, where citizens and candidates are characterized by positions
in a common ideological space, and citizens derive a direct beneﬁtf r o mf u l ﬁlling their civic
duty of voting.3 Citizens may be uncertain about candidates’ positions and may have dif-
ferent information about the candidates running in the various elections they face. Because
of this uncertainty (or lack of information), citizens may make mistakes, that is vote for the
“wrong” candidate. The possibility of mistakes makes voting potentially costly, and may
induce citizens to abstain. If a citizen chooses to participate in an election, she votes for the
candidate associated with the smallest cost of voting.
Given citizens’ ideological preferences, information, and sense of civic duty, we charac-
terize their optimal participation and voting decisions in the elections they face. We show
that the extent to which voting is costly for diﬀerent citizens, which aﬀects their propensity
to participate in each election, is systematically related to their ideological preferences, the
distribution of the possible alternatives they may be facing, as well as their degree of uncer-
tainty. Also, the optimal voting behavior implied by our model is consistent with expected
utility maximization in a spatial setting, and may generate all possible voting proﬁles (that
is, voting for each possible combination of candidates in the various elections citizens face).
Turning attention to the empirical study of participation and voting in U.S. national elec-
tions, our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, the estimated structural model
ﬁts individual-level data for the 2000 presidential and congressional elections remarkably
well. In particular, it replicates the patterns of abstention, selective abstention, split-ticket
voting, and straight-ticket voting observed in the data, both for the overall sample and by
individual demographic characteristics. The model also implies a positive relationship be-
tween information and turnout: since uninformed citizens are more likely to make “voting
mistakes” and hence have larger costs of voting, ceteris paribus, they abstain more than in-
formed citizens. With respect to the issue of selective abstention, our estimates imply that,
since in general there is more information (and hence less uncertainty) about presidential
candidates than congressional candidates, on average the cost of voting in the presidential
3Since in the environment we consider there is a continuum of citizens, no individual voter can decide the
outcome of any election.
2election is smaller than in a congressional election. This provides an explanation for the fact
that we observe more abstention in congressional elections than in the presidential election.
With respect to the issue of split-ticket voting, our analysis suggests that heterogeneity in
candidates’ and citizens’ ideological positions and in citizens’ information is suﬃcient to
account for the amount of split-ticket voting observed in the data.
Second, our estimates allow us to quantify the relationships between observed individ-
ual characteristics and unobserved citizens’ ideological preferences, information, and civic
duty. For example, our estimates imply that ceteris paribus: older citizens are relatively
more conservative, more informed, and have a higher sense of civic duty than their younger
counterparts; although citizens who are relatively more educated tend to be better informed
and have a higher sense of civic duty, individuals with relatively low levels of education (i.e.,
without a high school degree) and individuals with relatively high levels of education (i.e.,
with at least a college degree) are more liberal than individuals with intermediate levels of
education; and individuals who are either catholic or protestant tend to be more conservative,
more informed, and have a higher sense of civic duty than those who are not christians.
Third, we use our estimated model to assess the eﬀects of policies that may increase
citizens’ information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior. We ﬁnd
that increasing the sense of civic duty in the population or making citizens more informed
about electoral candidates decreases abstention. However, while an increase in civic duty
also reduces selective abstention and has a negligible eﬀect on split-ticket voting, the eﬀect of
more information is to increase selective abstention as well as the relative fraction of voters
who split their ticket.
Finally, we ﬁnd that a considerable part of the incumbency advantage in congressional
elections (i.e., the observation that incumbents on average obtain a larger vote share than
challengers), can be explained by the fact that more information is typically available on
incumbents than challengers. However, this informational advantage plays an important
role only for Democratic incumbents but not for Republican incumbents. This result is
due to the fact that there is less variation among the ideological positions of Republican
candidates than Democratic candidates, which implies that the Republican “brand name”
conveys more information to citizens than the Democratic one.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related
literature. In Section 3, we present a model of participation and voting in multiple elections.
In Section 4, we apply this model to the study of citizens’ behavior in U.S. presidential and
congressional elections. Section 5 contains a description of the data we use in estimation,
and Section 6 the results of our empirical analysis. The results of the policy experiments are
described in Section 7, and concluding remarks are in Section 8.
2 Related Literature
As we mentioned in the Introduction, our paper is related to several distinct literatures.
Here, we describe the relationship of our work to each of these literatures in turn. The
starting point of theoretical research on voter turnout is represented by the “calculus of
voting” framework, originally formulated by Downs (1957) and later developed by Tullock
(1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). According to this framework, given a citizenry of
size N facing an election e where there are two alternatives (e.g., two candidates or two policy




i and abstains otherwise. Here,
pe
i is the probability that citizen i’s vote decides the election (i.e., her vote is pivotal), be
i is
t h e( i n d i r e c t )b e n e ﬁt to citizen i associated with inducing her desired electoral outcome, de
i
is the (direct) beneﬁt of voting in election e, which includes any beneﬁt citizen i may derive
from fulﬁlling her civic duty of voting, and ce




i are often referred to as capturing the instrumental (or investment)
and expressive (or consumption) value of voting, respectively. Most of the recent theoretical
research on voter turnout has focused on modeling these two components of the beneﬁt
from voting. Pivotal-voter models (e.g., Borgers (2004), Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983, 1985)), endogenize the probability that a citizen’s vote is decisive.4 Ethical-
voter models (e.g., Coate and Conlin (2004), Feddersen and Sandroni (2002) and Harsanyi
(1980)), endogenize the concept of civic duty. All these models, however, focus on whether
people vote or abstain in a single election, and assume away the issue of how people vote by
postulating that each individual has an alternative she supports and would vote for if she
4Note, however, that as the size of the electorate N increases, pe
i converges to zero, thus making the term
pe
ibe
i (and hence pivotal calculations) negligible in large elections.
4chooses to participate in the election.
A third group of models focuses instead on the cost of voting, ce
i. Uncertain-voter models
(e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) and Matsusaka (1995)), endogenize a com-
ponent of the cost of voting related to the limited information available to citizens in an
election. In the environments studied by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), the cost
of voting derives from the fact that each vote may be pivotal, and a vote cast out of ignorance
may induce the wrong candidate to get elected. Hence, less informed citizens may choose to
a b s t a i ni na ne l e c t i o ni no r d e rt ol e tm o r ei n f o r m e dc i t i z e n sd e t e r m i n et h eo u t c o m eo ft h e
election.5 Matsusaka (1995), on the other hand, proposes a model where individuals derive
higher beneﬁts from voting the more conﬁdent they are of their voting choices, independent
of whether their vote can decide an election. Hence, the more informed individuals are about
the candidates in an election, the more conﬁdent they are about making the right voting
decisions, and the more likely they are to participate in the election. The framework we
consider embeds an uncertain-voter model similar to the one of Matsusaka (1995) into a
spatial model of voting in multiple elections, and relates the cost of voting for each citizen
to her ideological position relative to the candidates’.6
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on the structural estimation of models
of voter turnout. Coate, Conlin and Moro (2005) estimate a pivotal-voter model using data
on local liquor referenda in Texas.7 Their analysis shows that while the estimated model is
5This eﬀect also vanishes in large electorates.
6T h e r ea r et w oo t h e ri n t e r e s t i n ga p p r o a c h e s to the study of voter turnout that do not ﬁti n t ot h es i m p l e
classiﬁcation described here. The ﬁrst is based on minmax regret theory (Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974)), and
postulates that citizens may vote in order to avoid the regret they would experience if they were to abstain
in a situation where their vote would have been decisive. The second postulates that citizens are averse to
ambiguity (Ghirardato and Katz (2002)). Hence, citizens may abstain in an election if the policy positions
of both candidates are ambiguous and “ambiguity complements” (that is, one candidate looks better than
the other under some scenario, while the opposite is true under another scenario). For recent surveys of
the vast theoretical literature on voter turnout see, e.g., Dhillon and Peralta (2002), Feddersen (2004), and
Merlo (2006).
7For another interesting empirical analysis of pivotal-voter models using data from local school budget
referenda in Oregon, see Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1987).
5capable of predicting observed levels of turnout quite well, at the same time it predicts closer
electoral outcomes than they are in the data. In other words, the only way the theory behind
pivotal-voter models can explain actual turnout, is if elections are very close, which makes
their outcome very uncertain and hence individual votes more likely to be pivotal. These
circumstances, however, are not consistent with what is observed in reality, thus leading to a
rejection of this class of models. On the other hand, using the same data, Coate and Conlin
(2004) structurally estimate a group rule-utilitarian model of voter turnout, and show that
ethical-voter models are capable of reproducing all of the important features of the data.8
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that uncertain-voter models may oﬀer a valid
alternative to ethical-voter models as useful tools for interpreting the empirical evidence on
voter turnout.9 In addition, our structural model of turnout and voting can also account for
observed patterns of abstention and voting in multiple elections (e.g., selective abstention
and split-ticket voting).
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on the structural estimation of models of voting
behavior in U.S. national elections. Using data on how individuals vote in two consecutive
presidential elections, Degan (2004) and Shachar (2003) estimate two diﬀerent models aimed
at explaining the various patterns of voting observed in the data (where some voters vote for
the same presidential candidate or the candidate of the same party in the two consecutive
elections, while others switch their vote between elections). While Degan’s model emphasizes
the role of incomplete information about candidates’ valence, Shachar’s model focuses on
habit formation. Mebane (2000), on the other hand, estimates a structural model of voting
in presidential and congressional elections based on the theoretical work of Fiorina (1992)
and Alesina and Rosenthal (1996). His analysis provides some empirical support for the
idea that moderate voters may split their ticket in order to balance the House with the
President.10 Unlike our paper, however, all these studies ignore the issue of abstention and
8Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999) reach a similar conclusion by estimating a structural model that shares some
of the features of the Coate and Conlin model, using state-level voting data for U.S. presidential elections.
9For other empirical analyses of the role of information in elections see, e.g., Alvarez (1998), and Palfrey
and Poole (1987).
10Note, however, that Burden and Kimball (2002) provide empirical evidence that contradicts balancing
arguments, and ﬁnd that voters are not intentionally splitting tickets to induce divided governments and
6focus exclusively on the behavior of voters.
3M o d e l
We consider a situation where there is a continuum of citizens who face m simultaneous
two-candidate elections for a variety of public oﬃces. For each election, citizens have to
decide whether to vote or abstain, and if they vote, which candidate to support.
Let i denote a generic citizen, e a generic election, and Je = {ae,b e} the set of candidates
in election e =1 ,...,m.E a c h c a n d i d a t e je ∈ Je is characterized by an ideological position
yje ∈ Y ,w h e r eyae 6= ybe for all e =1 ,...,m,a n dY ⊆ Rr, r ≥ 1,i st h e( r-dimensional)
ideological space.
For each election e ∈ {1,...,m},l e t∆e
i denote citizen i’s information in election e,w h i c h
can be represented as a joint probability distribution function over the ideological positions






i (·) captures the fact that
citizens may be uncertain about the ideological positions of candidates in an election, and
that citizens may diﬀer with respect to the information they possess. Let ∆i = {∆1
i,...,∆m
i }
denote citizen i’s information set.
The assumption that there is a continuum of citizens implies that no single vote can ever
be pivotal in any election (i.e., using the terminology of the calculus of voting framework
described above, pe
i =0for all i and all e ∈ {1,...,m}). Hence, the only beneﬁt citizen i
derives from voting is the direct beneﬁto ff u l ﬁlling her civic duty, di ≥ 0,w h i c hm a yd i ﬀer
across citizens.
Each citizen i has an ideological position yi ∈ Y , and evaluates alternative ideologies






  − y )
2 (1)
which is single-peaked at yi.11
Because citizens may be uncertain about candidates’ ideological positions, they may
make “voting mistakes” or, equivalently, vote for the “wrong” candidate. This is what makes
moderate policies.
11For a justiﬁcation of the use of a quadratic speciﬁcation of the payoﬀ function ui (y) in an electoral
environment with uncertain candidates’ positions see, e.g., Alvarez (1998).
7voting potentially costly in this framework. In particular, given her information regarding





, and her ideological position yi, citizen i’s cost




















































Each cost corresponds to the expected payoﬀ loss for citizen i of voting for one candidate
when the candidates’ ideological positions are such that she would prefer the position of the
other candidate.
Let te
i ∈ {0,1} and ve
i ∈ {ae,b e} denote citizen i’s turnout and voting decisions in election
e =1 ,...,m, respectively, where te
i =1(te
i =0 ) if she participates (abstains) in election e,
and ve
i = ae (ve
i = be) if she votes for candidate ae (be). For each election e =1 ,...,m, citizen



















Without loss of generality, the decision problem in (4) can be reformulated as a two-
stage optimization problem, where in the ﬁrst stage the citizen decides whether or not to
participate in the election and, in the second stage, she decides whom to vote for (conditional
on voting). To solve this problem we work backwards, starting from the last stage. In the














ae if ci (be;yi,∆e
i) >c i (ae;yi,∆e
i)
be if ci (be;yi,∆e
i) <c i (ae;yi,∆e
i)
(5)
a n di nt h ee v e n tt h a tci (be;yi,∆e
i)=ci (ae;yi,∆e
i) citizen i randomizes between the two
alternatives with equal probability.
This leads to the following proposition which states that if a citizen participates in an
election it is optimal for her to vote for the candidate associated with the highest expected
payoﬀ.
8Proposition 1 If a generic citizen i participates in election e ∈ {1,...,m} where candidates




























i]=0 , citizen i votes for either candidate with equal probability.
Proof: To prove the result it is suﬃcient to show that, for any citizen i and any election















,u s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions of ci (ae) and ci (be) c o n t a i n e di ne q u a t i o n s(2)











































































Note this is a general result which does not depend on the functional form of ui (y). ¥











































When we consider the m elections faced by a citizen i all together, it should be clear that
diﬀerences in ∆e
i across elections may make it optimal for the citizen to participate in some
12If a citizen is indiﬀerent between voting and abstaining we assume that the tie is broken in favor of
participation. This assumption is, however, inconsequential.
9elections and abstain in others.13 Also, depending on the conﬁguration of the ideological
positions of candidates in the diﬀerent elections relative to the positions of citizens, the
citizens’ optimal voting rules may imply diﬀerent combinations of voting decisions in the
m elections. To illustrate these results and the main properties of the model we present a
simple example.
3.1 An Example
Consider a situation where a society is facing two elections (i.e., m =2 ). The set
of candidates in each election is {a1,b 1} and {a2,b 2}, respectively, and each candidate is
characterized by a position in the (unidimensional) liberal-conservative ideological space
Y =[ −1,1]. In particular, we have that ya1 =0 , yb1 =1 , ya2 =0 ,a n dyb2 =1 /2.
Each citizen i has an ideological position yi ∈ [−1,1].T h eb e n e ﬁto fv o t i n gi st h es a m e
for all citizens and is equal to di =1 /4 for all i’s. Each citizen is informed in election 2,a n d
can either be informed or uninformed in election 1. I fac i t i z e ni si n f o r m e di na ne l e c t i o n ,
she knows the positions of the candidates running in that election. If a citizen is uninformed
in election 1, she knows that ya1 ∈ Y a1 = {−1,−1/2,0,1/2}, yb1 ∈ Y b1 = {−1/2,0,1/2,1},
ya1 <y b1,a n dPr
©¡
ya1,yb1¢
∈ Y a1 × Y b1 : ya1 <y b1ª
=1 /10. We refer to a citizen who is




I denote the information of an informed and uninformed citizen in election 1,a n d
of an informed citizen in election 2, respectively.
When the ideological space is unidimensional (i.e., r =1 ), it is straightforward to show
that Proposition 1 implies that each citizen’s optimal voting rule in each election is a “cutoﬀ”
rule: that is, for each election e =1 ,2, and each citizen i,g i v e ni’s information set ∆e
i,t h e r e
exists a cutoﬀ point τe
i (∆e
i) ∈ [−1,1] such that citizen i votes for candidate ae in election e
if yi <τ e
i (∆e
i) and votes for be if yi >τ e
i (∆e
i). In particular, for any ∆e












2E [ybe − yae | ∆e
i]
. (8)
13The same would be true if we were to allow di to diﬀer across elections. However, since we want to
assess the extent to which selective abstention can be explained by information considerations, we assume
here that a citizen’s sense of civic duty does not depend on the election.
10Since in this example all citizens are informed in election 2, τ2
i (∆2
I)=1 /4 for all citi-
zens. On the other hand, if citizen i is informed in election 1, τ1
i (∆1
I)=1 /2,a n di fs h ei s
uninformed in election 1, τ1
i (∆1
U)=0 . It follows that, conditional on participating in both
elections, informed citizens would vote for candidates a1 and a2 if their ideological position
is less than 1/4,f o ra1 and b2 if their ideological position is between 1/4 and 1/2,a n df o rb1
and b2 if their ideological position is greater than 1/2. Similarly, conditional on participating
in both elections, partially informed citizens would vote for candidates a1 and a2 if their
ideological position is less than 0,f o rb1 and a2 if their ideological position is between 0 and
1/4,a n df o rb1 and b2 if their ideological position is greater than 1/4.14
Turning attention to citizens’ optimal turnout decisions, notice that since citizens who are
informed in an election can never make voting mistakes, their cost of voting in the election




I)=0 ). It follows that informed citizens
participate in both elections and partially informed citizens always participate in election
2.U s i n g t h e d e ﬁnitions in (2) and (3), and citizens’ optimal voting rules characterized in
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The cost in (9) is increasing in yi for yi < 0 and decreasing for yi > 0. In fact, the result
that the cost of voting in an election is single-peaked in correspondence of the cutoﬀ point
is general, and follows from the fact that the payoﬀ function ui(y) is strictly decreasing in
|yi − y| and concave.15
14For the purpose of the example we ignore the case where a citizen is indiﬀerent between voting for either
candidate and hence randomizes.
15To see that this is the case, note that when citizen i optimally votes for candidate ae (which occurs if yi <
τe




Clearly, the closer yi is to the cutoﬀ point τe
i, the larger the set of possible candidates’ positions pairs for
which the citizen makes voting mistakes. Also, for any two citizens j and k with the same information, and
ideological positions yj <y k <τ e
j = τe
k, for any candidates’ positions pair (yae,ybe) for which both citizens
11Given (9), since citizens participate in election 1 if c1
i (·) ≤ di =1 /4 and abstain otherwise,
it follows that partially informed citizens with positions yi ∈ [−1/28,1/28] participate in
election 2 and selectively abstain in election 1. All other citizens participate in both elections.
By combining citizens’ optimal participation and voting decisions, we obtain that for the
citizenry in this example we would observe individuals voting for each possible combination
of candidates in the two elections (i.e., citizens voting for a1 and a2, a1 and b2, b1 and a2,
and b1 and b2, respectively), as well as individuals who selectively abstain in election 1.I t
should also be clear that allowing for information asymmetries in both elections, as well
as individual heterogeneity in civic duty, would also generate the possibility of observing
individuals abstaining in both elections and individuals who selectively abstain in election
2. These conclusions extend to the general speciﬁcation of the model considered above.
4 Turnout and Voting in U.S. National Elections
In this section, we apply the general framework illustrated in Section 3 to analyze empir-
ically turnout and voting in U.S. national elections in a presidential election year.16 We con-
sider a situation where citizens face two simultaneous elections (i.e., m =2 ): a presidential
election and a congressional election.17 While the presidential election is nation-wide (that
is, all citizens face the same set of candidates regardless of where they reside), congressional
elections are held at the district level (that is, citizens residing in diﬀerent congressional
districts face diﬀerent sets of candidates). Hence, the environment analyzed in Section 3
corresponds to the situation faced by the citizens within a generic district.
make a voting mistake by voting for candidate ae, the associated payoﬀ loss is higher for citizen k than
for citizen j as long as the payoﬀ function is strictly concave. Similar considerations apply when citizens
optimally vote for be.
16In the United States, citizens are called to participate in national elections to elect the President and
the members of Congress. While congressional elections occur every two years, the time between presidential
elections is four years. We refer to an election year where both presidential and congressional elections occur
simultaneously as a presidential election year.
17Consistent with the existing literature on split-ticket voting, we restrict attention to House elections,
which are held every election year for every district. Hence, each citizen faces both a presidential election
as well as a House election. Senate elections, on the other hand, are staggered and only about a third of all
states have a Senate election in any given election year.
12Let h ∈ {1,...,435} denote a generic congressional district, P the presidential election,
H the congressional election in district h,a n de ∈ {P,H} a generic election.18 In each
election, there are two candidates running for oﬃce: a Republican candidate, Re,a n da
Democratic candidate, De,a n dw el e tj ∈ {RP,D P,R H,D H} denote a generic candidate.19
Each candidate j is characterized by a position yj in a unidimensional liberal-conservative
ideological space Y =[ −1,1] (i.e., r =1 ), and is either an incumbent or a challenger. We let
qj be an indicator that takes the value one if candidate j is an incumbent and zero otherwise.
We refer to an election where neither candidate is an incumbent as an open election.
To capture the fact that within each election the democratic candidate is typically
more liberal than the republican candidate, we assume that presidential and congressional
candidates are drawn from populations of potential candidates with distribution functions
FP
¡
yD,yR | yD <y R¢
and FH
¡
yD,yR | yD <y R¢
, respectively. Note that these functions
may be diﬀerent for presidential and congressional elections, and they may also diﬀer across
districts in congressional elections.
In each district there is a continuum of heterogeneous citizens.20 Citizens diﬀer along
several observed dimensions. Each citizen residing in district h has a vector of demographic
characteristics x, which includes the citizen’s age, race, gender, education, religion and in-
come. Citizens also diﬀer with respect to their general attitude toward political parties and
may either feel an attachment to a speciﬁc party or no attachment at all. Following the lit-
erature, we refer to feelings of partisan attachment as party identiﬁcation and let k =( Dem,
Rep, Ind) be a vector of mutually exclusive indicator variables denoting a citizen’s party
identiﬁcation, where Dem =1 , Rep =1 ,o rInd =1indicates that the citizen identiﬁes
herself as a democrat, republican, or independent, respectively.
Citizens also diﬀer with respect to some unobserved characteristics. In particular, citi-
18The total number of U.S. congressional districts is 435.
19We ignore the fact that in some elections independent candidates may also be running and we exclude
from our analysis elections where only one candidate runs unopposed.
20By law, in order to satisfy the basic democratic principle of “one person one vote,” Congressional
districts are drawn (and periodically redrawn) so that each district contains approximately the same number
of citizens. Hence, all districts have the same size.
13zens’ ideological positions, information, and civic duty are not observable by the econometri-
cian. Each citizen i has an ideological position yi (xi,k i) ∈ Y , which we allow to depend on
the citizen’s demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation. We let Fy(y | x,k) denote
the distribution of citizens’ ideological positions which we assume to be a Beta distribution
over the support Y =[ −1,1] with parameters α and β,w h e r e
α =e x p( αxx + αkk)
and
β =e x p( βkk).21
Another dimension of unobserved heterogeneity is represented by citizens’ information.
For each election e ∈ {P,H}, a citizen can either be informed about the candidates in
election e or uninformed. The information potentially available to citizens depends on the
election. Incumbents who run for reelection to a seat in Congress as well as presidential
candidates (regardless of their incumbency status), have public records of their activities
while in oﬃce.22 Therefore, their positions can in principle be known before an election.
Challengers who run for a congressional seat, on the other hand, typically do not have
comparable records.23 Hence, before the elections, the only information potentially available
on challengers who run for Congress are the distributions from which they are drawn.
Based on these considerations, we assume that if a citizen is informed in the presidential
election, she knows yDP and yRP. Similarly, if a citizen residing in district h is informed in
congressional election H,s h ek n o w sqDH and qRH,a n di fqDH = qRH =1 ,s h ek n o w syDH and
yRH;i fqDH =1and qRH =0 ,s h ek n o w syDH and FH
¡
yDH,yR | yDH <y R¢
;i fqDH =0and
qRH =1 ,s h ek n o w syRH and FH
¡
yD,yRH | yD <y RH¢
;a n di fqDH = qRH =0 ,s h ek n o w s
FH
¡
yD,yR | yD <y R¢
.24 On the other hand, if a citizen is uninformed,w ea s s u m es h eh a s
21The family of Beta distributions is the most ﬂexible family of parametric distributions for continuous
random variables with a ﬁnite support (see, e.g., Johnson and Kotz 1970; vol. 1, pp. 37-56).
22For example, the history of roll call voting by each member of Congress is readily available.
23Although many individuals who run for Congress have prior experience in public oﬃces at the local or
state level (see, e.g., Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005)), public records of their activities either do not exist
or are not easily accessible.
24Note that for each election H, there is either an incumbent Republican running against a Democratic
14uniform priors over the possible positions of candidates running for elections. In particular,
we let UP(yD,yR | yD < 0 <y R) and UH(yD,y R | yD <y R) denote the uniform distributions
of the citizen’s priors over the positions of the Republican and the Democratic candidates
in the presidential and the congressional election, respectively.25 The information a generic
individual i possesses is summarized in her information set ∆i.
We let π(x,k,w) denote the probability that a citizen is informed in some election, which
we allow to depend on the citizen’s demographic characteristics x and party identiﬁcation k,
as well as a vector of additional variables w that we use to predict the citizen’s unobserved
information and that do not enter into other components of the model:
π(x,k,w)=
exp(θxx + θkk + θww)
1+e x p( θxx + θkk + θww)
.
Moreover, πP (k)π(x,k,w), πH (k)π(x,k,w),a n dπPH(k)π(x,k,w) are the probabilities
of being informed only in the presidential election, only in the congressional election, or in

























































Abusing notation, we let ∆P
i , ∆H
i , ∆PH
i ,a n d∆U
i denote the information set of a generic
citizen i who is informed only in the presidential election, informed only in the congressional
election, informed in both elections, or uninformed in both elections, respectively.
challenger (i.e., qRH =1and qDH =0 ), or a Democratic incumbent running against a Republican challenger
(i.e., qRH =0and qDH =1 ), or a Democratic and a Republican incumbent running against each other
(i.e., qRH =1and qDH =1 , which may occur after redistricting), or the election is open (i.e., qRH =0and
qDH =0 ).
25Consistent with basic stylized facts about American politics (which we assume to be known even by
uninformed voters), the restrictions we impose guarantee that in any election the Republican candidate is
relatively more conservative than the Democratic candidate, and the within party range of the positions of
presidential candidates is smaller than that of congressional candidates for both parties. See, e.g., Poole and
Rosenthal (1997).
15The last component of citizens’ characteristics that is not observed by the econometrician
is their direct beneﬁt from voting. Here we assume that citizen i derives a beneﬁt di from
fulﬁlling her civic duty of voting which we allow to depend on the citizen’s demographic
characteristics x and party identiﬁcation k, as well as a vector of additional variables z
that we use to predict the citizen’s unobserved civic duty and that do not enter into other
components of the model. We let Fd(d | x,k,z) denote the distribution of civic duty in the
population. Since the beneﬁt from voting is relative to the cost of voting, Fd(d | x,k,z)
is deﬁned over the support [0,c],w h e r ec is the maximum cost of voting. In particular,
we assume that di can only take the value 0 (“low”) or c (“high”), and Fd(d | x,k,z) is a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter
γ =
exp(γxx + γkk + γzz)
1+e x p( γxx + γkk + γzz)
denoting the probability that the value of civic duty is high.26
5 Data and Estimation
We consider the U.S. presidential and congressional elections of 2000.27 Our empirical
analysis relies on two sources of data: the American National Election Studies (NES), and
the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE scores.28
The 2000 NES contains detailed, individual-level information on the participation and
voting decisions in presidential and congressional elections of a representative (cross-section)
sample of the American voting-age population.29 For each individual in the sample, we
26In estimation, we also considered the more general speciﬁcation where Fd(d | x,k,z) is a Beta distribution
over the support [0,c] with parameters δ =e x p( δxx + δkk + δzz) and ζ =e x p( ζkk). However, we could not
reject the simpler Bernoulli speciﬁcation at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
27Recall that the presidential candidates were GeorgeW .B u s h( R )a n dA lG o r e( D ) .B u s hw o nt h ee l e c t i o n
and the Republican party also obtained a majority in the House of Representatives.
28Both data sets are online at http://www.umich.edu/~nes and http://voteview.com, respectively.
29Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we drop from our sample individuals who reside in Washington
D.C. (since they do not face congressional elections) and those who face uncontested congressional elections
(since they do not have the option of voting either for the Republican or the Democratic candidate). After
eliminating observations with missing values in any of the variables we consider in our analysis, the sample
size is equal to 979.
16observe the congressional district where he or she resides, h, the identity of the Democratic
and the Republican candidate competing for election in his or her congressional district,
(DH,R H), and whether any of the candidates is an incumbent in that district, (qDH,q RH).F o r
each of the two elections (presidential and congressional) faced by each individual, the NES
also contains self-reported information on whether the individual abstains in the election,
votes for the Democratic candidate or votes for the Republican candidate.30 We let V i
P ∈
{A,R,D} and V i
H ∈ {A,R,D} denote citizen i’s choices in the presidential and congressional
election, respectively, where A denotes abstention and D or R indicate that the citizen voted
for the Democratic or the Republican candidate, respectively. We refer to V i =( V i
P,Vi
H) ∈
{AA, AD, AR, DA, RA, DD, DR, RD, RR} as citizen i’s observed participation and voting
proﬁle.
The NES also contains detailed information on individual demographic characteristics
and self-reported party identiﬁcation. In our analysis, we consider the following variables:
the variable Age denotes an individual’s age; Black is a race indicator variable that equals
one if an individual is black; Lowedu is a dummy variable denoting whether an individual
does not have a high school degree; Highedu is a dummy variable denoting whether an
individual has a college degree; Female is a gender indicator variable that is equal to one
if an individual is a woman; Lowinc is a dummy variable denoting whether an individual’s
family income is lower than median family income; Christian is a dummy variable that is
equal to one if an individual is either catholic or protestant and zero otherwise; and Dem,
Rep and Indare three (mutually exclusive) dummy variables denoting whether an individual
considers him or herself to be a democrat, a republican or an independent, respectively.31
Using the notation we introduced to describe our structural model, we have that x =( Age,
30For discussions of potential limitations of the survey data on participation and voting in the NES see,
e.g., Anderson and Silver (1986), Palfrey and Poole (1987), Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980) and Wright
(1993). Note, however, that the NES represent the best and most widely used source of individual-level data
on electoral participation and voting.
31Consistent with most of the empirical literature on voting in U.S. national elections, we classify inde-
pendents leaning democrats as democrats and independents leaning republicans as republicans. However,
we also estimated our model by treating such individuals as independents. This change has little eﬀect on
our main empirical results.
17Black, Lowedu, Highedu, Female, Lowinc, Christian) and k =( Dem, Rep, Ind).
As described in Section 4, our empirical analysis also relies on variables that may help
predict (or identify) an individual’s unobserved information status and civic duty. The vari-
ables contained in the NES that are related to information are the following: Attention is
a dummy variable denoting whether an individual paid attention to electoral campaigns;
News is a dummy variable denoting whether an individual followed news about presidential
and congressional campaigns; Watch is a dummy variable denoting whether an individual
watched television programs about electoral campaigns; and Contact is a dummy variable
denoting whether an individual was contacted by any political party to talk about the cam-
paigns. The variables contained in the NES that are related to civic duty are the following:
CareP and CareH are two dummy variables denoting whether an individual cares about
the presidential and the congressional election, respectively; Jury is a dummy variable de-
noting whether an individual considers serving on juries an important duty for a citizen;
Interest is a dummy variable denoting whether an individual is interested in government
and public aﬀairs; Discuss is a dummy variable denoting whether an individual discusses
politics with other people; and Talk is a dummy variable denoting whether anybody talked
to the individual about registering and voting. Using the notation introduced in Section 4,
we let z =( A t t e n t i o n ,N e w s ,W a t c h ,C o n t a c t ) and w =( CareP, CareH, Jury, Interest,
Discuss, Talk). The sample distributions of participation and voting proﬁles are reported
in Table 1, both for the overall sample and by party identiﬁcation. Descriptive statistics of
all the variables we use in our analysis are contained in Table 2.
To measure the positions of candidates competing in the 2000 presidential and congres-
sional elections, we use the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE scores. Using data on roll
call voting by each member of Congress and support to roll call votes by each President,
Poole and Rosenthal developed a methodology to estimate the positions of all politicians
who ever served either as Presidents or members of Congress, on the liberal-conservative
ideological space [−1,1].32 Estimates that are comparable across politicians and across time
32For a discussion of potential limitations of the methodology proposed by Poole and Rosenthal see, e.g.,
Heckman and Snyder (1997). For a comparison of alternative estimation procedures see Clinton et al. (2004).
Note, however, that none of the other procedures has been used to generate a comprehensive data set similar
18are contained in their NOMINATE Common Space Scores data set.33 These estimates pro-
vide the measures of the ideological positions of the presidential candidates, yDP and yRP,
and the measures of the positions of all incumbents in any congressional election H, yDH and
yRH. In addition, we use the empirical distributions of these estimates for Democratic and
Republican members of the House of Representatives in 2000 as our measures of the distri-
butions FH (·|· ). In particular, we assume that FH (·|· )=FL (·|· ) for all H ∈ L,w h e r e
L ∈ {Northeast, Midwest, West, South} denotes a region of the United States. This speciﬁ-
cation allows us to capture important geographic diﬀerences among congressional candidates
for each party, while at the same time allowing us to accurately characterize each empirical
distribution function.34 T a b l e3c o n t a i n st h ep o s i t i o n so fthe presidential candidates and
descriptive statistics of the distributions of Democratic and Republican representatives in
each of the four regions we consider.
As explained in the Introduction, our analysis models an important component of a cit-
izen’s cost of voting, which is related to her information about the ideological positions of
the candidates competing in an election, and to her own ideological position relative to the
candidates’. At the same time, however, it has been often pointed out that the cost of
voting also has an exogenous component, which is related to a variety of external factors
(like, for example, the weather conditions on election day, or the day of the week when an
election is held, or many other unobservable factors).35 In our empirical analysis, we account
for the possible existence of external factors that may contribute to explain abstention by
introducing an exogenous probability that each individual in any given location abstains
t ot h eo n eb yP o o l ea n dR o s e n t h a l .
33For details about the methodology and the data see Poole (1998) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2001).
Note that the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE data set also contains estimates of the positions of politicians
on a second dimension, which we do not use in our analysis. In fact, according to Poole and Rosenthal (1997),
after 1970 the second dimension has become irrelevant and “roll call voting again became largey a matter of
positioning on a single, liberal-conservative dimension” (p. 5).
34Note that it would be unfeasible to characterize non-parametrically a separate distribution function for
each party in each state (let alone each district), since the number of representatives of either party in each
state in any given year is small.
35See, e.g., Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980).
19in both elections. In order to minimize the number of additional parameters that need to
be estimated, we consider only eight possible locations that correspond to the eight census
regions of the continental United States, and let ρ =( ρ1,...,ρ8) denote the vector of the para-
meters that measure these probabilities, p =( p1,...,p8),w h e r ep  =e x p( ρ )/[1 + exp(ρ )],
  =1 ,...,8.36
We estimate our model by maximum likelihood. The contribution to the likelihood of
each observation in the sample is equal to the probability of observing proﬁle V ∈ {AA,
A D ,A R ,D A ,R A ,D D ,D R ,R D ,R R }, conditional on the vector of characteristics X =





γx,γk,γz,ρ ).G i v e nX and φ, the probability of each participation and voting proﬁle observed
in the data can be calculated using equations (5) and (7), Proposition 1, and the speciﬁcation
of the structural model described in Section 4.37 The log-likelihood function is then equal
to the sum of the log of the probability of each individual participation and voting proﬁle
observed in the data, over all the individuals in the sample. The likelihood function is
reported in the Appendix.
6R e s u l t s
In this section, we summarize our estimates and our main empirical ﬁndings, discussing
each component of the model in turn. The maximum likelihood estimates (and standard
errors) of the model parameters are reported in Table 4. Before interpreting the estimates
and discussing their implications, we begin by assessing the ﬁto ft h em o d e l .
6.1 Goodness of Fit
In Table 5, we compare the distribution of the participation and voting proﬁles predicted
by the model to their empirical distribution. Since in our sample only one citizen abstains in
the presidential election while voting in the congressional election, we combine the proﬁles
AD and AR with the proﬁle where citizens abstain in both elections, AA, and denote the
combined proﬁle by AA+. To assess how well the model ﬁt st h ed a t aw eu s eP e a r s o n ’ s
36Note that in our sample there are no individuals who reside in any of the external states.
37The calculations of ce
i (·), ve∗
i (·) and te∗










where, for each proﬁle V ∈ Ω = {AA+,D A ,R A ,D D ,D R ,R D ,R R }, f(V ) denotes the
empirical frequency of the proﬁle, b f(V ) denotes the frequency predicted by the estimated
model, and n is the number of observations.38 As we can see from Table 5, the estimated
model tracks aggregate observed citizens’ participation and voting decisions in the 2000
presidential and congressional elections remarkably well, and the goodness-of-ﬁtt e s tc a n n o t
reject the model at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
In order to explore further the extent to which our model ﬁts the patterns of selective
abstention and split-ticket voting observed in the data, we then combine the proﬁles in Ω
into four proﬁles corresponding to abstention (AA+), selective abstention (DA and RA),
straight-ticket voting (DD and RR), and split-ticket voting (DR and RD), and compare
the predictions of the model to the empirical distributions by citizens’ demographic charac-
teristics and party identiﬁcation.39 As before, the criterion we use to assess the ﬁto ft h e
model is Pearson’s chi-square test.40 Table 6 reports the goodness-of-ﬁt test statistic and the
corresponding p-value for each demographic characteristic and party identiﬁcation.41 In all
of these cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model is a good approximation
38The critical value of a chi-square test with six degrees of freedom at the 5% level of conﬁdence is 12.59.
This is, however, an upper bound because it does not take into account that the parameters in the model
are estimated.
39In addition of being interested in this broader classiﬁcation of participation and voting proﬁles per
se, partitioning the sample by demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation reduces the number of
observations in each subsample. The broader classiﬁcation rules out the possibility that some of the cells in
the subsamples corresponding to each individual proﬁle are either empty or contain very few observations (a
situation that compromises the informativeness of a statistical comparison between model predictions and
data).
40The goodness-of-ﬁt test in this case is a chi-square with three degrees of freedom. The corresponding
critical value at the 5% conﬁdence level is 7.81.
41Note that for the overall sample, the value of test statistic for the broader classiﬁcation of proﬁles is
3.736, with a corresponding p-value of 0.291.
21of the data generating process at conventional signiﬁcance levels. We conclude that the esti-
mated model performs extremely well in reproducing observed patterns of participation and
voting in individual-level data, both at the aggregate level and by individual characteristics.
6.2 Citizens’ Preferences, Information, and Civic Duty
Our estimates allow us to quantify the relationships between observed individual charac-
teristics and unobserved citizens’ ideological preferences, information, and civic duty. The
parameters αx,α k, and βk characterize the distributions of citizens’ positions on the liberal-
conservative ideological space [−1,1] conditional on their demographic characteristics x and
party identiﬁcation k, Fy(y | x,k). In order to interpret the estimates we obtained, note that




exp(αxx + αkk) − exp(βkk)
exp(αxx + αkk)+e x p( βkk)
.
Hence, for example, a negative (positive) coeﬃcient in αx denotes that, holding everything
else constant, citizens with the corresponding characteristic are on average relatively more
liberal (conservative). As we can see from the estimates reported in Panel A of Table 4,
citizens’ demographic characteristics are systematically related to their ideological positions.
Ceteris paribus, older citizens are relatively more conservative than their younger counter-
parts; blacks tend to be more liberal than non-blacks; individuals with relatively low levels
of education (i.e., without a high school degree) and individuals with relatively high levels
of education (i.e., with at least a college degree) are more liberal than individuals with in-
termediate levels of education; women tend to be more liberal than men; individuals whose
income is below the median tend to be more liberal than those with higher levels of income;
and individuals who are either catholic or protestant tend to be more conservative than
those who are not christians.42 Furthermore, democrats are on average more liberal than
independents, which in turn are on average more liberal than republicans. In fact, the esti-
mated distribution of republicans’ ideological positions stochastic dominates the distribution
of independents’ ideological positions, which in turn stochastic dominates that of democrats’
positions.
42Degan (2004) obtains similar ﬁndings from the estimation of a dynamic model of voting in the 1968 and
1972 presidential elections.
22Note that unlike most empirical studies of voting in U.S. national elections, we do not
use self-reported measures of citizens’ ideological placement.43 Rather, we adopt a revealed
preference approach and estimate the distributions of unobserved ideological positions of
citizens from their observed participation and voting decisions, conditional on their observed
characteristics and the identity of the candidates in the elections they face.44 Am a i na d v a n -
tage of this approach is that the estimated distributions we recover have the same support
of the distribution of candidates’ ideological positions (which is the same across elections),
and the estimated citizens’ positions are comparable across individuals.45
The parameters θx,θ k,θ w,θ
P
k , and θ
H
k fully characterize the probabilities citizens are
informed about electoral candidates, where a positive (negative) coeﬃcient denotes a higher
(lower) probability of being informed. As we can see from the estimates reported in Panel B
of Table 4, citizens’ demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation are systematically
related to their information status. Also, note that all the covariates in the vector of addi-
tional variables w that we introduced to help us identify citizens’ unobserved information
status are, in fact, positively and signiﬁcantly related to the probability of being informed.
That is, individuals who pay attention to political campaigns, those who follow news or TV
programs about presidential and congressional campaigns, and those who are contacted by
parties to talk about electoral campaigns are predicted to be relatively more informed about
the positions of candidates in presidential and congressional elections.
In order to quantify some of the relationships, in the second column of Table 7 we report
the (average) marginal probabilities of being informed in some election by demographic char-
acteristics and party identiﬁcation.46 These estimates indicate that older and more educated
43Av a r i a b l ei nt h eN E St h a ti sw i d e l yu s e di ne m p i r i c a lw o rk, for example, contains citizens’ self-reported
placements on a liberal-conservative 7-point scale (see, e.g., Mebane (2000)).
44Note that this is the standard approach in empirical microeconomics and has been used for a wide range
of applications including, for example, the estimation of individual valuations from the observed behavior of
bidders in auctions.
45Clearly, this is not the case for existing categorical variables of citizens’ self-placement on ideological
scales.
46Note that the estimated average probability of being informed in some election in the overall sample is
equal to 0.63 (and the probabilities of being informed only in the presidential election, only in the congres-
23individuals tend to be more informed than their younger and less educated counterparts,
respectively; blacks are slightly more informed than non-blacks; women tend to be less in-
formed than men; individuals whose income is below the median tend to be less informed
than those with higher levels of income; and christians are remarkably more informed than
non christians. We also ﬁnd that partisans are on average more informed than independents
and that, among partisans, republicans are on average more informed than democrats.
Turning attention to the relationship between citizens’ characteristics and their sense
of civic duty, the parameters γx,γ k, and γz quantify the probability citizens have a high
sense of civic duty, or a high direct beneﬁt from participating in an election. Given our
speciﬁcation, a positive (negative) coeﬃcient indicates that the corresponding variable is
positively (negatively) associated with a high sense of civic duty. Similar to our results on
information, the estimates reported in Panel C of Table 4 indicate that citizens’ demographic
characteristics and party identiﬁcation are systematically related to their civic duty. Also,
all the variables in z that we introduced to help us identify citizens’ unobserved civic duty
are positively and signiﬁcantly related to the probability of having high civic duty. That
is, caring about congressional and presidential elections, considering serving on juries an
important duty, being interested in public aﬀairs, talking about politics with other people,
and having been told about registering and voting, are all important predictors of citizens
having a high sense of civic duty.
The third column in Table 7 contains estimates of the (average) marginal probabilities
of having high civic duty by demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation.47 These
estimates suggest that older and more educated individuals are on average more likely to have
a high sense of civic duty than their younger and less educated counterparts, respectively;
blacks have a slightly lower sense of civic duty than non-blacks; women have a lower sense of
c i v i cd u t yt h a nm e n ;i n d i v i d u a l sw h o s ei n c o m ei sb e l o wt h em e d i a nt e n dt oh a v eam u c hl o w e r
probability of having high civic duty than those with higher levels of income; and christians
are on average much more likely to have a high sense of civic duty than non-christians. We
sional election, or in both elections are equal to 0.38, 0.21 and 0.04, respectively).
47Note that the estimated average probability of having a high sense of civic duty in the overall sample is
equal to 0.66.
24also ﬁnd that partisans are more likely to have a high sense of civic duty than independents,
and republicans are more so inclined than democrats.
Finally, the parameter vector ρ characterizes the probability citizens abstain in both
elections due to “exogenous” components of the cost of voting which we do not model (e.g.,
environmental factors). Given our speciﬁcation, the estimates reported in Panel D of Table
4 imply that on average this probability is equal to 5% (ranging from 0.2% to 11% across
the eight census regions of the continental United States).48 Since the overall abstention rate
in both presidential and congressional elections predicted by our model is equal to the one
in the data, this implies that the “endogenous” component of the cost of voting we model
accounts for 82% of the abstention rate we observe in the data.
6.3 Citizens’ Turnout and Voting Behavior
Our estimated model implies a positive relationship between information and turnout. In
each election, uninformed citizens are more likely to make “voting mistakes” and hence have
larger costs of voting. It follows that citizens who are uninformed in an election are more
likely to abstain in that election than informed citizens. The diﬀerence in the participation
behavior of informed and uninformed citizens predicted by the model is most noticeable in
presidential elections, where informed citizens (who know the positions of the presidential
candidates and hence have no cost of voting) never abstain. Uninformed citizens, on the other
hand, are uncertain about the positions of the presidential candidates, and may therefore
optimally choose to abstain if their cost of voting is larger than their beneﬁto ff u l ﬁlling their
civic duty of participating in the election. Uninformed citizens abstain more than informed
ones also in congressional elections, but since even informed citizens face some uncertainty
about the positions of congressional challengers, abstention rates in congressional elections
are positive also among informed citizens.
Consistent with what we observe in the data, our estimated model predicts that overall
abstention is higher in congressional elections than in the presidential election, due to the
fact that some individuals vote in the presidential election but abstain in the congressional
48The estimated probability for each of the eight regions is equal to 0.062, 0.073, 0.002, 0.037, 0.109, 0.005,
0.091, and 0.005, respectively.
25election (selective abstention). In fact, our estimates imply that the average cost from
voting in the presidential election is smaller than in a congressional election, which is a
direct consequence of the fact that, in general, there is more information, and hence less
uncertainty, about presidential candidates than congressional candidates.49
When combined with our previous ﬁndings that independents are systematically less
informed than democrats, who are in turn less informed than republicans (Table 7), these
results also explain the fact that independents are relatively more likely to abstain than
partisan citizens, and that democrats are relatively more likely to abstain than republicans
(Table 1).
Our model is not the only one that generates a positive relationship between information
and turnout. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) consider a pivotal voter model with asym-
metric information where some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable
that aﬀects the utility of all voters. Their analysis shows that uninformed voters may strictly
prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when they are not indiﬀerent be-
tween the two candidates and voting is costless. In their model, voters condition their actions
not only on their information, but also on what they can infer about the state of the world in
the event their vote is pivotal. Hence, it may be an equilibrium for the uninformed voters to
abstain and to let the informed voters decide the electoral outcome (see also Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1999)). Although the two models are very diﬀerent, both in our analysis and in
that of Feddersen and Pesendorfer, citizens take into account the consequence of voting for
the “wrong” candidate, and this may lead to abstention. Their analysis, however, is purely
theoretical and since their argument relies on the probability that an individual vote may
decide an election, the mechanism they describe is unlikely to be empirically relevant in large
elections such as U.S. presidential and congressional elections.
Palfrey and Poole (1987) develop an index of voter information and ﬁnd it is signiﬁcantly
49Note that in standard spatial models of voting (e.g., Downs (1957), Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Riker
and Ordeshook (1968)), abstention typically arises either out of “indiﬀerence” (when the two candidates are
equally distant from a citizen’s ideal point), or out of “alienation” (when they are both too distant from a
citizen’s ideal point). This is not the case in our model. Also note that explanations of abstention based on
indiﬀerence and/or alienation are typically not supported by the data (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1984)).
26related to ideological extremism and voting behavior in presidential elections.50 In particular,
they ﬁnd that individuals with a high level of information tend to be more extreme than those
with low levels and are much more likely to vote (see also Alvarez (1998)). Both of these
ﬁndings are consistent with our empirical results. In addition, our analysis also explains
observed patterns of participation and voting behavior in presidential and congressional
elections.
With respect to the observed behavior of voters in U.S. national elections, note that our
estimated model accounts for the amount of split-ticket voting observed in the data. As illus-
trated in the example of Section 3.1 (suppose that in the example ae denotes the Democratic
candidate and be the Republican one in each election e =1 ,2,w h e r e1 is the congressional
election and 2 the presidential one), straight-ticket and split-ticket voting naturally arise as
possible outcomes in our model. Given the heterogeneity in candidates’ ideological positions
across congressional districts, the estimated distributions of citizens’ ideological positions and
information imply predicted voting behaviors that are consistent with the citizens’ voting
proﬁles observed in the data.
There is a large empirical literature in political science that analyzes the issue of split-
ticket voting in U.S. national elections.51 The goal of these studies, however, is to test
alternative theories of why voters may split their ticket.52 The results of our analysis indicate
that the observed behavior of voters in presidential and congressional elections is consistent
with the predictions of a spatial model of voting with asymmetric information.
50Their index of voter information in the 1980 presidential election is based on NES data about voter
perceptions of candidates’ positions on several issues measured on a 7-point scale.
51See, e.g., Burden and Kimball (2002) and Mebane (2000).
52Theoretical research on split-ticket voting in U.S. national elections has focused mainly on the policy
implications of divided government, and falls broadly within two categories. A ﬁrst group of theories (e.g.,
Chari, Jones, and Marimon (1997) and Jacobson (1990)), postulate that there are diﬀerent issues surrounding
the presidential and the congressional elections, thus providing diﬀerent (election speciﬁc) incentives for
citizens and candidates. A second group of theories (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and Fiorina (1992)),
argue that since the policy-making process entails some compromise between the executive and the legislature,
citizens with relatively moderate positions may vote for candidates of diﬀerent parties for President and
Congress in an attempt to moderate the ﬁnal policy outcome.
277 Policy Experiments
An appealing feature of the structural approach is that we can use the estimated model to
conduct a variety of policy experiments. Here, we consider three counterfactual experiments.
In the ﬁrst two experiments, we quantify the potential eﬀects of policies that may increase
citizens’ information and civic duty, respectively, on their turnout and voting behavior. In
particular, we consider a situation where all citizens are informed in both presidential and
congressional elections (i.e., π =1and πPH =1 ), and one where all citizens have a high
sense of civic duty (i.e., γ =1 ), and we compare the participation and voting behavior
implied by our model under each of these counterfactual scenarios to the predictions of
the estimated model in the baseline scenario. In the third experiment, we then assess the
extent to which incumbents may have an advantage over challengers in congressional elections
because of the superior information available on politicians who are already in oﬃce. In
particular, we consider a situation where the only information potentially available to citizens
about the two candidates in the congressional election in their district is the distribution
FH
¡
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.53
The results of our ﬁrst two experiments are summarized in Table 8. When all citizens are
informed (Experiment 1) or all citizens have a high sense of civic duty (Experiment 2), the
overall abstention rate in both elections reduces to the level induced by exogenous factors,
w h i c hi se q u a lt o5 % .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a t, barring unusual circumstances that may
prevent an individual from going to vote, citizens with a high sense of civic duty would never
deliberately abstain (regardless of the cost of voting induced by the possibility of making
voting mistakes), and informed citizens would not choose to abstain in the presidential
election (regardless of their sense of civic duty). However, while in a situation where all
citizens have a high sense of civic duty selective abstention disappears (for the same reason
described above), when all citizens are informed, the fraction of voters who selectively abstain
increases from 9% to 27%. This result is due to the fact that even when citizens are informed,
the presence of challengers always entails some uncertainty in congressional elections, and
53In other words, we treat each congressional election as if it were an open election, by suppressing the
information relative to the ideological position of incumbents.
28hence the possibility of making voting mistakes. Although when all citizens are informed
the overall abstention rate in congressional elections decreases by 5 percentage points, the
combined eﬀect of a much larger reduction in the overall abstention rate in the presidential
election (which decreases by 23 percentage points) results in a noticeable increase in the
fraction of citizens who participate in the presidential election but abstain in congressional
elections. Hence, while making citizens more responsible drastically reduces abstention in all
elections, making them more informed may have a relatively small eﬀect in some elections.
Turning attention to the eﬀect of information and civic duty on voting, we ﬁnd that
when all citizens are informed, the fraction of individuals who split their ticket increases by
4 percentage points. The overall vote share of Democratic candidates in the elections for the
House of Representatives also increases by 5 percentage points (from 49% to 54%). When all
citizens have a high sense of civic duty, on the other hand, there are no noticeable changes
in the aggregate behavior of voters.
Table 9 contains the results of our third experiment regarding the incumbency advan-
tage in congressional elections. Since this experiment does not aﬀect citizens’ behavior in
the presidential election, in the table we report the distributions of participation and vot-
ing proﬁles in congressional elections both for the overall sample and for each of the three
subsamples of citizens deﬁned by their party identiﬁcation (democrats, republicans, and in-
dependents). Note that these distributions refer to the individuals in our sample who are
facing congressional elections where incumbents are running, and we distinguish between
elections where the incumbent is a Democrat or a Republican.54 Overall, we ﬁnd that by
eliminating the information advantage of Democratic incumbents reduces the proportion of
individuals voting for them by about 2 percentage points. Conversely, we do not ﬁnd any
eﬀect for Republican incumbents.55 T h i sa s y m m e t r yi sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a ti nt h ed a t at h e r e
is less variation among the ideological positions of Republican candidates than Democratic
candidates, which implies that the Republican “brand name” conveys relatively more infor-
mation to the voters than the Democratic one. Hence, the additional information that their
54The number of observations is equal to 420 and 446, respectively.
55Note that the eﬀect on abstention is negligible (the overall abstention rate in congressional elections
increases by 1 percentage point, and the increase is similar for democrats, republicans, and independents).
29behavior in oﬃce provides to the voters has a larger eﬀect for Democratic candidates than
for Republicans.
It is also interesting to notice that the eﬀect of removing the information advantage of
incumbents on the behavior of independents is negligible, regardless of the party aﬃliation
of the incumbent. Furthermore, while the voting behavior of partisan voters does not appear
to be very sensitive to the information available on incumbents of their own party, the voting
choices of republican voters change signiﬁcantly in favor of Democratic incumbents when they
have an information advantage. In fact, removing the information advantage of Democratic
incumbents reduces the proportion of republicans voting for them by about 5 percentage
points. The eﬀect on the behavior of democrats when the incumbent is a Republican is
much smaller (about 1 percentage point).
8 Concluding Remarks
Understanding citizens’ electoral behavior represents a fundamental step in the analysis
of democratic institutions. In this paper, we have proposed a new framework for analyzing
citizens’ participation and voting decisions in multiple, simultaneous elections, which focuses
on citizens’ heterogeneity in ideological preferences, information, and sense of civic duty.
We have applied our framework to study empirically the issue of turnout and voting in
U.S. national (presidential and congressional) elections, using individual-level data for the
2000 elections. We have shown that our estimated model is capable of replicating the patterns
of abstention, selective abstention, split-ticket voting, and straight-ticket voting observed in
the data. Moreover, we have used the estimated model to quantify the relationships between
a variety of citizens’ characteristics and their ideological preferences, information, and civic
duty, and to assess the potential eﬀects of several policies on citizens’ turnout and voting
behavior. For example, we have shown that policies that increase citizens’ information about
electoral candidates have similar eﬀects on abstention than policies that increase their sense
of civic duty. However, while an increase in civic duty also reduces selective abstention and
has a negligible eﬀect on split-ticket voting, the eﬀect of more information is to increase
selective abstention as well as the relative fraction of voters who split their ticket.
It is important to observe that the framework we have proposed in this paper is quite
30general, and can be applied to analyze empirically the electoral behavior of individuals
facing any number of simultaneous elections, including local elections and referenda, as well
as having ideological preferences over more than one policy dimension. At the same time, our
model is rather simple, and abstracts from a number of factors like, for example, diﬀerences
in candidates’ competence, or citizens’ preferences over candidates’ personal traits (e.g.,
charisma), which may also play an important role in explaining the data. We plan to explore
these issues in future work.
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where 1{·} is an indicator equal to one when the expression inside the
braces is true and zero otherwise. Also, let  i denote the region where citizen i resides, so
that p i denotes the exogenous probability that citizen i abstains in both elections. For each
participation and voting proﬁle V i ∈ {A A ,A D ,A R ,D A ,R A ,D D ,D R ,R D ,R R },o u r
structural model implies that:
Pr{V i = AA} =
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dFy(yi | xi,k i),
Pr{V i = RD} =
(1 − p i)
Z






























































































dFy(yi | xi,k i),
and
Pr{V i = RR} =
(1 − p i)
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dFy(yi | xi,k i).
The log-likelihood function is then equal to the sum of the log of the probability of each
individual participation and voting proﬁle observed in the data, over all the individuals in
the sample.
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AA  273 128 79 66
AD  000 0
AR  100 1
DA  47 39 4 4
RA  38 6 27 5
DD  285 261 13 11
DR  57 39 12 6
RD  32 5 26 1
RR  246 23 210 13













Age  47.1726 16.7399 
Black  0.1032 0.3043 
Female  0.5352 0.4990 
Lowedu  0.0981 0.2975 
Highedu  0.3075 0.4617 
Lowinc  0.5536 0.4974 
Christian  0.6394 0.4804 
Dem  0.5117 0.5001 
Rep  0.3790 0.4854 
Ind  0.1093 0.3122 
Attention  0.7794 0.4149 
News  0.8294 0.3763 
Watch  0.8243 0.3808 
Contact  0.3922 0.4885 
CareP  0.7814 0.4135 
CareH  0.6629 0.4730 
Jury  0.6139 0.4871 
Interest  0.5884 0.4924 
Discuss  0.7998 0.4004 
Talk  0.4443 0.4971 
 
 





 Democrats  Republicans 
Region  Mean  St. Dev. Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. Min.  Max.
Northeast  -0.36 0.10 -0.55 -0.14 0.24 0.14 -0.05  0.62
Midwest  -0.33 0.14 -0.68 -0.01 0.37 0.12 0.13  0.69
South  -0.24 0.14 -0.53 0.15 0.41 0.11 -0.01  0.87




  Al Gore  George W. Bush 
 -0.29  0.40 
 Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Standard Errors 
 
Variable Estimate  Standard  Error Variable Estimate  Standard  Error 
 
Panel A: Ideological Positions 
 
 
Panel B: Probability of being Informed 
         αx:            θx: 
Age  -0.0870 0.0508  Age  -0.2493 1.0596 
Black  -0.1049 0.0344  Black    1.2800  0.6112 
Lowedu   0.0241  0.0315  Lowedu   -0.9605  0.5248 
Highedu  -0.0439 0.0180  Highedu    0.8828  0.5979 
Female  -0.0234 0.0160  Female    0.1885  0.3584 
Lowinc  -0.0188 0.0207  Lowinc  -0.7175 0.4312 
Christian   0.0441  0.0172  Christian    0.7917  0.3495 
        αk:            θk: 
Dem   5.2047  0.3048  Dem   -2.8015  0.7644 
Rep   5.0409  0.2438  Rep   -1.8809  0.7288 
Ind   4.9181  0.5375  Ind   -3.1038  0.8234 
        βk:            θw: 
Dem   5.2288  0.2987  Attention    1.2890  0.3903 
Rep   4.7949  0.2638  News    0.6882  0.4123 
Ind   4.7913  0.5381  Watch    0.9051  0.4288 
Contact    1.2374  0.4362 




Panel C: Probability of High Civic Duty 
Dem   2.0160  1.4110 
        γx:  Rep   3.8011  2.3183 
Age    4.2840  0.6612  Ind   0.7907  1.9590 
Black    0.4489  0.3472          θ
H
k:    
Lowedu   -1.0610  0.3263  Dem   0.4675  1.5009 
Highedu    1.1347  0.2487  Rep   3.8635  2.2986 
Female    0.0453  0.1990  Ind   0.3116  1.7854 
Lowinc  -0.7606 0.2083 
Christian    0.4340  0.2009 
       γk: 
 
Panel D: Probability of Exogenous Abstention 
Dem   -2.8015  0.7644          ρ: 
Rep   -1.8809  0.7288  Region 1  -2.7186         1.2533    
Ind   -3.1038  0.8234  Region 2  -2.5458         0.5578 
       γz:  Region 3  -6.1888 3.0349 
CareP   1.0095  0.2349  Region 4  -3.2643         1.0769 
CareH   0.4627  0.2082  Region 5  -2.0992         0.3555 
Jury   0.5835  0.1924  Region 6  -5.3582         3.0138 
Interest   0.3511  0.2065  Region 7  -2.3026         0.8941 
Discuss   0.7136  0.2400  Region 8  -5.3765         3.2160 















+  0.2799 0.2775 
DA  0.0480 0.0639 
RA  0.0388 0.0285 
DD  0.2911 0.2877 
DR  0.0582 0.0573 
RD  0.0327 0.0237 




(6)  11.347 
p-value    0.078 
Note: The profile AA















Dem  4.270 0.234 
Rep  0.107 0.991 
Ind  1.918 0.590 
AgeL  0.878 0.831 
AgeM  5.052 0.168 
AgeH  1.394 0.707 
Black  0.731 0.866 
Non-Black  3.608 0.307 
Lowedu  1.570 0.666 
Mediumedu  5.661 0.129 
Highedu  0.268 0.966 
Female  4.189 0.242 
Male  0.679 0.878 
Lowinc  3.731 0.292 
Highinc  1.147 0.766 
Christian  4.464 0.216 
Non-Christian  0.770 0.857 
Note : Since Age is a continuous variable, we divided the sample into three 
age groups: AgeL denotes individuals with Age ≤30, AgeM individuals with 











Probability of being 
Informed 
 
Probability of having 
High Civic Duty 
 
Dem  0.59 0.69 
Rep  0.76 0.74 
Ind  0.32 0.29 
AgeL  0.52 0.44 
AgeM  0.64 0.66 
AgeH  0.65 0.78 
Black  0.69 0.63 
Non-Black  0.62 0.67 
Lowedu  0.30 0.37 
Mediumedu  0.57 0.60 
Highedu  0.84 0.88 
Female  0.60 0.63 
Male  0.64 0.70 
Lowinc  0.51 0.55 
Highinc  0.77 0.80 
Christian  0.70 0.73 
Non-Christian  0.49 0.54 
Note : Since Age is a continuous variable, we divided the sample into three age groups: AgeL 





Table 8: Policy Experiments on Information and Civic Duty 
 
Profile  Baseline  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
AA
+  0.2775 0.0496 0.0496 
DA 0.0639  0.1765  0.0000 
RA 0.0285  0.0915  0.0000 
DD 0.2877  0.3425  0.4302 
DR 0.0573  0.0913  0.0756 
RD 0.0237  0.0275  0.0315 
RR 0.2615  0.2213  0.4132 
Note: The profile AA









Table 9: Policy Experiment on the Incumbency Advantage 
 
Overall sample  Democrats  Republicans  Independents   





A  0.3543  0.3622 0.3296 0.3353 0.2672 0.2789 0.7019  0.7099
D  0.3607  0.3405 0.5432 0.5357 0.1223 0.0757 0.1211  0.1106





A  0.3499  0.3608 0.3401 0.3471 0.2752 0.2902 0.6924  0.7031
D  0.2788  0.2753 0.5112 0.5174 0.0785 0.0632 0.0914  0.0945
R  0.3713  0.3639 0.1487 0.1355 0.6463 0.6466 0.2162  0.2024
 